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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellee Linda Sondesky brought claims against her former employer, Cherry 
Scaffolding, Inc., and Cherry Scaffolding’s president, Stephen Ellis (together, the 
“Appellants”), for, among other things, retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938 (“FLSA”), 28 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and defamation.1  Appellants counterclaimed for 
conversion of the overtime monies paid to Sondesky.  A jury found in Sondesky’s favor 
on all claims, and Appellants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the 
alternative, a new trial.  The District Court denied the motions.  Appellants appealed, 
arguing that (1) Sondesky was an exempt employee under the FLSA, and therefore her 
retaliation claims failed, and (2) punitive damages were improperly granted.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s order.   
I. BACKGROUND 
Sondesky worked as a bookkeeper for Cherry Scaffolding from October 2015 to 
March 2016.  Sondesky testified that early in her employment, she had a telephone 
conversation with Ellis, in which they agreed that the office was “a mess,” and that it 
would take Sondesky overtime hours to get “all of this straightened out.”  App. 56.  
Sondesky testified that Ellis agreed to her additional hours during this conversation and 
that she proceeded to submit weekly timesheets to Ellis reflecting her overtime hours. 
In 2016, Cherry Scaffolding terminated Sondesky for insubordination.  Following 
Sondesky’s termination, Cherry Scaffolding filed a lawsuit against Sondesky in a 
 
1 Sondesky filed two separate lawsuits—one against Cherry Scaffolding and one 
against Ellis.  The cases were consolidated for trial. 
Pennsylvania small claims court, accusing her of stealing money for overtime and 
seeking to recover overtime compensation from Sondesky.  Although Sondesky prevailed 
in the suit in small claims court, the matter did not end there.  Ellis contacted several of 
Sondesky’s former employers, emailing at least one, and accused Sondesky of stealing 
money from Cherry Scaffolding. 
As a result of Ellis’s actions, Sondesky brought suit against Appellants in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming, inter alia, that: (1) Cherry Scaffolding and/or 
Ellis unlawfully retaliated against her, in violation of the FLSA, by suing her in small 
claims court; (2) Ellis unlawfully retaliated against her, in violation of the FLSA, by 
sending an email to her former employer which stated, among other things, that Sondesky 
stole money from Cherry Scaffolding; and (3) Ellis unlawfully defamed Sondesky when 
he sent that email to her former employer.2  Appellants brought counterclaims for breach 
of fiduciary duty and conversion. 
The District Court held a jury trial.  At the close of Sondesky’s case, Appellants 
made a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motion seeking judgment as a matter of law.  
The District Court denied the motion, and all the claims proceeded to the jury, which 
found in favor of Sondesky and against Appellants with respect to all claims.  The jury 
awarded Sondesky $1,000 in compensatory damages for her first retaliation claim, $1 in 
nominal damages for her second retaliation claim, and $100,000 in punitive damages for 
 
2 Sondesky’s other claims were either dismissed or withdrawn before trial.  
her defamation claim.  The jury did not award compensatory damages for Sondesky’s 
defamation claim. 
Thereafter, Appellants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or, in the alternative, a new trial.  The District 
Court denied the motion.  This timely appeal followed. 
II. DISCUSSION3 
Appellants argue that the District Court erred in denying its motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s denial 
of judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  In re Lemington Home for the Aged Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 777 F.3d 620, 626 (3d Cir. 2015).   
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b) should 
only be granted “if, as a matter of law, the record is critically deficient of that minimum 
quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.”  Id. (quoting 
Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001)).  In 
making that determination, “we must examine the record in a light most favorable to 
[Sondesky as the non-moving party], giving her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, 
even though contrary inferences might reasonably be drawn.”  Id. (quoting Dudley v. S. 
Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1977)).  
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because 
Sondesky’s Amended Complaint asserted a claim arising under the FLSA, and 
supplemental jurisdiction over Sondesky’s Pennsylvania state law claims and Cherry 
Scaffolding’s counterclaims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
A. Appellants Forfeited the Argument Regarding Sondesky’s 
Employment Status  
 
As a preliminary matter, Appellants argue that the District Court erred by finding 
that Sondesky was a non-exempt employee under the FLSA.4  This general issue was 
presented to the District Court, including in a pretrial order and in proposed jury 
instructions.  The District Court declined to give those instructions to the jury.5  
However, we need not decide whether that action by the District Court was proper 
because that question is not before us today—Appellants do not appeal the District 
Court’s decision to not instruct the jury on that point.  See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of 
the Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that this Court 
does not reach arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief). 
Appellants only appeal the denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.  Therefore, whether the evidence supported that Sondesky was a non-exempt 
employee, for the purposes of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, is now 
raised for the first time on appeal.6  
 
4 The FLSA creates two classifications of employees—exempt and non-exempt.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 213.  Pursuant to the FLSA, employers are not required to pay exempt 
employees overtime wages.  29 U.S.C §§ 207(a)(1), 213.  Thus, Appellants now argue 
that Sondesky was not entitled to overtime pay thereby undermining her retaliation 
claims. 
5 While the parties do not explain the District Court’s decision on appeal, the 
record supports that the District Court found Sondesky’s employment status was 
irrelevant for determining Sondesky’s retaliation claims. 
6 To the extent Appellants are insinuating that the District Court was required to 
address this issue sua sponte in its order denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, they provide no case law or argument to support this 
proposition. 
It is clearly established that this Court does not generally consider arguments that 
are not preserved in the district court.  See, e.g., id. at 145–47; Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 
881 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2018); DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2007).  Arguments that are not preserved are either waived or forfeited.  Barna, 877 F.3d 
at 146.  Appellants have forfeited, rather than waived, this claim as they failed to timely 
assert it before the District Court.7  See id. at 147.   
In civil cases, while this Court does not review waived claims, we will review 
forfeited ones when “exceptional circumstances” exist, such as “when the public interest 
requires that the issue[s] be heard or when a manifest injustice would result from the 
failure to consider the new issue[s].”  Id. (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in 
original).  No such circumstances exist here.  Accordingly, because Appellants’ argument 
that Sondesky was an exempt employee under the FLSA is forfeited, and because no 
exceptional circumstances exist, we will not reach the merits of this claim.  
B. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict   
Appellants contend that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 
the jury’s verdict on both of the retaliation claims.  To establish a retaliation claim, a 
plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse 
employment decision; and (3) the adverse decision was causally related to the protected 
activity.  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 
7 Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” 
whereas, in contrast, forfeiture “is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.”  
Barna, 877 F.3d at 147 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).   
i. 1st Retaliation Claim 
In addition to its forfeited argument that Sondesky was an exempt employee, 
Appellants contend that trial evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude that they 
retaliated against Sondesky in violation of the FLSA when they sued her in small claims 
court as a result of her making a complaint asking to be paid overtime.  Appellants assert 
that the trial evidence was insufficient because (1) Sondesky engaged in no protected 
activity and (2) there was no causal connection between such complaint and the small 
claims court action.  This argument fails because, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Sondesky, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the 
jury reasonably could find that Sondesky engaged in a protected activity and that 
Appellants’ lawsuit was causally related to her filing a complaint seeking overtime.   
“To fall within the scope of the [FLSA] antiretaliation provision, a complaint must 
be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of 
both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for 
their protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14 
(2011).  Oral complaints meet this standard.  Id.   
At trial, Sondesky testified that, shortly after she began working for Cherry 
Scaffolding, she had a telephone conversation with Ellis asking for overtime wages, and 
that she sent Ellis a weekly breakdown of payroll timesheets that clearly indicated her 
overtime hours.  Contrary to Appellants’ argument that these actions do not “even 
remotely suggest an assertion of rights or objection[s],”  Appellants’ Br. 23, this is 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding: Sondesky told Ellis she would need to 
work more hours given the state of the business and submitted payroll sheets reflecting 
that request, thus asserting her rights to overtime pay and engaging in a protected activity 
under the FLSA. 
Additionally, there is sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the jury 
could find a causal connection between Sondesky’s protected activity and the small 
claims court action as Ellis testified that once he learned Sondesky had paid herself 
overtime, he pursued action in small claims court.  This is sufficient for a jury to find a 
causal connection between Sondesky’s protected activity—a complaint for overtime 
pay—and the small claims action against her.  
Therefore, Appellants’ argument fails.  
ii. 2nd Retaliation Claim 
Appellants also argue that the trial evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude 
that Ellis retaliated against Sondesky in violation of the FLSA when he sent an email to 
her former employer.  In that email, Ellis wrote that Sondesky stole money from Cherry 
Scaffolding, as a result of Sondesky’s protected activity under the FLSA. 
Appellants make this argument only in the heading of a section of the brief.  We 
are not clear on the substance of this argument as they make no other reference to it, and 
it is therefore forfeited.  See Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 
n.13 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting this Court has “consistently held that ‘[a]n issue is waived 
unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to 
an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court’”) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 
398 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Therefore, we need not address this scarcely mentioned argument.  
C. Punitive Damages were Permissible 
Appellants contend that the recovery of punitive damages for defamation is not 
permitted under Pennsylvania law when the jury does not award compensatory damages 
if the jury does not also find actual malice.8  Sondesky argues that the jury did find actual 
malice, but even if they did not, punitive damages are permissible when there is a finding 
that the party acted intentionally, recklessly, or with reckless indifference.   
 As the District Court noted, under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages may be 
awarded absent compensatory damages as long as there is a cause of action that supports 
the imposition of punitive damages.  In fact, Pennsylvania law permits punitive damages 
when there is “conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his 
reckless indifference to the rights of others.”  Hutchison ex. rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 870 
A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984)).   
Here, the verdict sheet shows the jury answered in the affirmative as to whether 
“Steven Ellis both act[ed] intentionally or recklessly in sending the email, and act[ed] 
with malice or reckless indifference to the rights of Linda Sondesky[.]”  App. 15 
(emphasis added).  Thus, the jury actually determined that Ellis acted with actual malice 
or reckless indifference to Sondesky’s rights.  Therefore, Appellants’ argument fails.  
 
8 To the extent Appellants make a constitutional argument as to the punitive 
damages, this argument has been forfeited as it was not raised in post-trial motions before 
the District Court.  Barna, 877 F.3d at 147 (stating that forfeiture is the failure to timely 
raise an argument before the lower court). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Appellants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a new 
trial.   
